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Abstract
We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the
core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the
democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision
of public goods to remain in office. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple
models that incorporate the core assumptions of their theory while avoiding modeling
choices we believe to be less appropriate. We also discuss reasons to be skeptical
that the historical record has in fact indicated that there is any relationship between
democracy and public goods provision, focusing on recent evidence with respect to
poverty and environmental degradation. We argue for a revised version of selectorate
theory, one that continues to emphasize the importance of the size of the winning
coalition, yet we believe provides a more realistic picture of democratic politics.
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The claim that pairs of democracies are less likely to come into armed conflict with one
another than the average pair of states is widely accepted in international relations. While
there may be other explanations for the absence of conflict amongst Western states, such
as the adoption of liberal economic policies and membership in international governmental
organizations, most scholars believe that democracy itself is an important force for peace.12
One reason that scholars remain skeptical of attempts to dispute the empirical association
between democracy and peace is that the theoretical explanations for why democracies ought
to be less conflict prone have proven quite fruitful, with many of their additional observable
implications having been supported. For many, the democratic peace is no longer an isolated,
if important, empirical finding, but the foundation of a mature research program.3
In many ways, selectorate theory lies at the heart of this research program. It not only
accounts for many patterns with respect to international conflict (Bueno de Mesquita et al.
1999, Morrow et al. 2006), but also international cooperation (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
2007, 2009),4 the provision of public goods, institutional change, leadership tenure, and many
other domestic level outcomes (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Until recently, it was one of
few explanations for the democratic peace that had been formalized.56
1On the impact of economic policies and IGOs, see, inter alia, Anderson and Souva (2010), Dorussen and
Ward (2008, 2010), Gartzke, Li and Boehmer (2001) and, especially, Gartzke (2007). Oneal and Russett
(1997), Oneal, Russett and Berbaum (2003), Russett and Oneal (2001) view these factors as complementary.
2Note that Henderson (2009) provides evidence, using a research design similar to that of Russett and
Oneal (2001), that the democratic peace does not hold in any region outside the West. Separate analysis
(not reported) reveals that the evidentiary basis is even more narrow than that, disappearing once one
omits the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Austria. Thus, we may be observing little more than the
transformation of relations between the European great powers following WWII. See also Gibler (2007), who
presents evidence that democracy is a consequence of the resolution of territorial disputes, and thus peace
may cause democracy rather than vice versa.
3See Ray (1995, 2003) for such claims.
4McGillivray and Smith (2008) builds upon selectorate theory to explain still further important patterns
of international cooperation. However, their argument is nonetheless distinct from selectorate theory.
5Some authors have suggested that audience costs might account for the democratic peace (Fearon 1994,
Schultz 2001). However, such arguments identify strictly monadic effects of democracy. Moreover, some
studies suggest that the relationship between regime type and the ability to generate audience costs is not
linear (Slantchev 2006, Weeks 2008). Finally, since all regimes can employ military mobilization, it is not
obvious why the ability to generate audience costs should afford democracies any particular advantage even
if they were better able to generate them (Slantchev 2005).
6However, see Debs and Goemans (2010), Fearon (N.d.), who provide alternative formal explanations of
the democratic peace that yield additional observable implications. See also Patty and Weber (2006) and
Jackson and Morelli (2007), both of whom argue that democracies are less prone to bad decision making.
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Recently, Clarke and Stone (2008) argued that the proxy variables for W and S con-
structed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) largely do not account for the relationship
between democracy and the outcome variables the authors analyze. Yet, even if we accept
their claim,7 one might wonder whether this reflects an actual shortcoming of selectorate
theory rather than the crude nature of the measurement of the theory’s key variables.
We seek to demonstrate that the problem is in fact fundamental to the theory. Specif-
ically, a few particular modeling choices in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 1999) prove
critical for their primary conclusions with respect to democratic governance. These choices
are neither required, nor justified, by the core assumptions of selectorate theory. They are
also, we believe, difficult to defend substantively. That they appear necessary for some of
the most celebrated results is therefore troubling. We also discuss reasons why we should
be skeptical of the apparent relationship between democracy and public goods provision,
which we believe the historical record does not unambiguously suggest democracies are more
inclined to do than non-democracies. At least not when public goods are defined properly.
To develop our theoretical claims, we analyze two simple formal models that are designed
to capture what the authors indicate are the critical assumptions of selectorate theory while
avoiding some of what we believe to be more problematic features of their models.8 The two
features that we focus upon are: 1) though the model in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999)
includes an outcome referred to as negotiations, the players do not negotiate over the issues
in dispute in the sense most scholars use the term, as the terms are not chosen by the actors
themselves, nor do negotiated agreements require consent from both parties, and 2) with
respect to the selection of a leader, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) assume that the outcome
preferred by the selectorate collectively obtains, without specifying any connection between
the choices made by individual members of the selectorate and the aggregate outcome.
7See the response (Morrow et al. 2008).
8When discussing the provision of public goods, we primarily focus on the model outlined in the first three
chapters of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). When discussing the democratic peace, we focus primarily on
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999). However, our critique of the decision rule for selecting leaders applies also
to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), and negotiations are modeled similarly in both Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(1999) and chapter 6 of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
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We begin by demonstrating that even if we assume that domestic politics operates as
described by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), it is still not clear that we should expect pairs
of democracies to be less likely to come into conflict than other pairs of states. The model
in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) does not allow either side to have any control over the
terms of a negotiated agreement. Further, it is not necessary for both sides to accept an
agreement for it to enter into force. In essence, the model in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999)
treats negotiations as randomly determined outcomes that one side can unilaterally impose
upon the other against their will, despite a longstanding belief that any state may choose to
use force at any time if it so pleases (Waltz 1979).
Using a simpler model than the one analyzed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), one
in which we take for granted the claim that political survival requires some leaders to try
harder in war than others, we show that we can derive the democratic peace when we model
negotiations the way they did. Next, we show that no relationship between domestic politics
and war follows from such a model once we allow for negotiations using the more flexible
ultimatum bargaining protocol popularized by Fearon (1995), since war never occurs in
equilibrium under complete information.
If we assume incomplete information, which Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) did not,
war naturally is possible. But our results still do not appear consistent with the democratic
peace. Rather, they strangely indicate that peace is either most likely or least likely in dyads
containing one autocracy and one democracy, relative to all other combinations. Whether
such dyads are especially peaceful or prone to conflict depends upon which is the initiator.
This result stands in stark contrast to extant empirical findings (Bennett 2006).
We next demonstrate the core assumptions of selectorate theory do not unambiguously
indicate that democracies will choose to provide public goods while in autocracies “good
policy is bad politics”, as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) frequently claim. Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003) assume that the only relevant calculation is whether members of
the incumbent leader’s current winning coalition would receive more goods if they retain the
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leader or if they replace the leader with some challenger. This, in effect, forces members of the
selectorate to ignore the very defining feature of public goods – that they do not individually
need to support the incumbent in order to enjoy any public goods she will provide if retained,
though they must do so in order to receive private goods. As we demonstrate below, if
individual members of the selectorate calculate the difference in the amount of goods they
personally expect to receive as a result of their individual choice of whom to support and
nothing else, then the leader may provide precisely zero goods in equilibrium.
Naturally, we might expect that other considerations enter into the decision of whom to
support, at least at the margins. We thus allow members of the selectorate to receive arbi-
trarily small non-material rewards or punishments for expressing support for the incumbent
leader.9 These non-material rewards may reflect ideological agreement, ethnic kinship, or
other factors. After we introduce these terms, in the form of private information held by
each member of the selectorate, we unsurprisingly find that leaders are required to distribute
resources in order to retain office. Leaders can no longer rely on the fact that there is no ma-
terial incentive to vote against a candidate who is certain to win even when that candidate
does not promise to deliver any resources to anyone.
However, the conditions under which leaders choose to allocate resources in the form of
public goods are very restrictive. So long as individual members of the selectorate cannot
expect to reduce the probability that the leader retains office by a substantial amount as
a result of their individual choice to support the challenger, the leader has no incentive to
provide public goods, which everyone knows they will receive should the leader win regardless
of whether they individually supporter her. Since it is exceedingly implausible for any one
voter to have a non-trivial impact on the outcome of an election in a modern electoral
democracy, this version of our model, which we believe reflects the core assumptions of
selectorate theory better than the next two models we consider, cannot explain why we
would observe the provision of public goods in such regimes.
9This is not dissimilar to the affinity term that Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) use to identify which
members of the selectorate the leader will include in her winning coalition.
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Nonetheless, while this represents a more significant departure from the core assumptions
of selectorate theory, we also consider an extension of the model where the expressive utility
members of the selectorate receive is explicitly a function of whether the incumbent provides
public goods, rather than representing non-material reasons for the selector to feel affinity
for the leader. Here, we unsurprisingly find that leaders have an incentive to produce public
goods. All leaders. Thus, this version of the model explains why democracies might provide
public goods, but it does so by raising the puzzle of why non-democracies do not.
To address this, we also consider one last version of the model in which we assume that
within all societies, there is a subset of the selectorate that derives expressive utility from
supporting leaders on the basis of non-material factors, and another subset whose expressive
utility depends upon the leader’s provision of public goods. We show that if the latter,
more public-spirited set of selectors, is arbitrarily large but not completely dominant, it
is impossible for leaders of democracies to construct a winning coalition without providing
public goods while it is possible for some autocrats to do so. However, we stress that this is
at best a poor substitute for the arguments of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), who, to their
credit, only argue that the low rates of public goods provision in non-democratic systems
reflects simple political necessity.10
We believe that neither of these two versions of the model provides a great fit to the
empirical record. Instead, we argue that focusing on the size of the winning coalition can
indeed be very useful for understanding the behavior of leaders. But we believe that there is
an important distinction between the claim that all leaders seek to retain office by providing
private goods to their winning coalition, which happens to mean a good proportion of the
populace in some cases, and the claim that leaders of regimes with small winning coalitions
rely on private goods while leaders of regimes with large winning coalitions rely on public
goods – goods which by their very definition benefit the entire populace.
10Their oft-repeated claim that “good policy is bad politics” illustrates that leaders of regimes with small
winning coalitions cannot afford to provide public goods even if they desire to, since doing so would necessarily
reduce the amount of private goods allocated to their key supporters, who would those overthrow the leader.
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For this reason, we stress that the theoretical argument presented by Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (2003) depends critically upon the fact that public goods are non-rival and non-
excludable.11 Yet very few of the outcome variables they consider, such as the number of
hospital beds, rates of female secondary education, immunizations, etc, can plausibly be
argued to be either non-rival or non-excludable. This is an important distinction, because
such measures also do not tell us about whether democracies primarily only provide benefits
to politically important members of society, of which there are by definition a great many
more than in most non-democratic regimes, or whether they are in fact more likely to produce
goods that benefit even the worst off in society.
To illustrate the importance of this distinction, we briefly discuss recent research on the
the relationship between regime type and true public goods provision. Specifically, we focus
on a prominent recent study that indicates that democracy is not in fact good for the poor
(Ross 2006) and recent evidence that democracies are not better stewards of the environment.
These studies also provide very good reason to believe that empirical tests that purport to
show that democracy benefits even the least of its citizens suffer from severe bias due to
the non-random pattern of missing data. While we acknowledge that this remains an active
area of research, we believe there is strong evidence so far that democracy empowers a large
proportion of its people, which is certainly preferable to empowering a rare few, but does
not necessarily work for everyone. We argue that even in democracies, the political process
is fundamentally a process of creating winners and losers.12
We begin with a brief review of selectorate theory. We then present a simple model
of crisis bargaining, followed by a simple model of leader selection. We then discuss the
implications of our analysis before concluding.
11They never claim that even in systems with large winning coalitions leaders wish to make everyone
happy, only that it is more economically efficient to do so by producing goods that benefit everyone in their
attempt to reward members of their winning coalition.
12Interestingly, some of the same authors have elsewhere offered a novel solution to the paradox of voting
that is in many respects consistent with the arguments we develop here. Specifically, Smith and Bueno de
Mesquita (N.d.) argue that even if an individual’s vote is not likely to be pivotal with respect to which
candidate assumes office, it may be pivotal in determining whether their precinct receives patronage. Thus,
voters are motivated by the impact of their individual decision on access to particularistic goods.
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Selectorate theory and the Democratic Peace
The literature on the democratic peace grew out of the empirical association between joint
democracy and a reduced likelihood of conflict.13 Scholars did not propose well-developed
theoretical explanations of the pattern until later. Two general approaches have been offered
to account for the finding: norms and institutions. Recently many scholars have gravitated
towards the institutional approach, for various reasons.14 One prominent variant of the
institutional approach emphasizes accountability. According to this view, all leaders are
assumed to be self-interested and to value retaining office first and foremost. Democrats are
expected to behave differently than autocrats, irrespective of their commitment to normative
values, simply because they rely upon a broader base of support to remain in office than do
autocrats, and thus must satisfy larger segments of the populace in order to advance their
own personal goal of retaining power. This is assumed to require promoting the public good.
To date, the most prominent theoretical explanation of the democratic peace that em-
phasizes the role of domestic institutions is selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003, 1999). Selectorate theory begins from the simple and appealing claim that much of
the behavior of states can be characterized by the relative proportion of a society’s pop-
ulation that falls into each of two groups: the selectorate, S, and the winning coalition,
W . The selectorate is the subset of the population who directly influence the selection of a
leader. In an electoral democracy, the selectorate is simply the electorate, while in military
juntas it largely consists of senior officers. The winning coalition is the minimal subset of S
whose support is sufficient to allow one to take office.15 In electoral democracies, W typically
constitutes a large proportion of S.16 In other regimes, W may be countably small.
13Babst (1964), Bremer (1992), Maoz and Russett (1993).
14See Henderson (2002), Rosato (2003) and Reiter and Stam (2002) for critiques of the normative approach.
However, see also Huth and Allee (2002) and Danilovic and Clare (2007).
15Note that this need not be the same as the subset of S who, in practice, actually do support a candidate,
which Morrow et al. (2008) term the supporting coalition to distinguish it from the winning coalition. Thus
selectorate theory suggests that even if a leader gathers the votes of 55% of the populace in an election, only
some subset of those supporters properly belong to W .
16However, W need not be half of S. In first-past-the-post systems, leaders require half of the votes in
half of the districts. In proportional representation systems, minority governments are often formed.
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The authors argue that the primary implication of selectorate theory is that leaders who
must satisfy larger winning coalitions are more likely to rely on the distribution of public
goods to satisfy their supporters rather than private goods, while the opposite is true of
leaders of systems where W is small. A secondary implication is that as the ratio of W to S
increases, the leader retains fewer resources for herself. As democratic states typically have
both a large W and a large ratio of W to S, they are expected to produce larger quantities
of public goods, and their leaders are more likely to be removed from office following policy
failures that constitute exogenous shocks to the leader’s resource base. Extensive empirical
analyses seemingly indicate that democracy is associated with many positive outcomes, and
that leaders of democracies are more susceptible to removal from office following policy failure
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).17
Selectorate theory has been applied to a wide range of outcomes beyond the democratic
peace, the provision of public goods, and the average duration of a leader’s tenure. The
authors have applied selectorate theory to explain tax rates, corruption, and other domestic
level factors (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). With respect to international relations, the
authors offer novel claims about which states are more likely to pursue regime change as a
war aim (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Morrow et al. 2006), and which states are most
likely to provide foreign aid, how much they choose to give, and to whom (Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith 2007, 2009). McGillivray and Smith (2006, 2008) draw on selectorate theory in
developing their theory of Leader-Specific Punishments, which explains patterns in sovereign
debt, trade, economic sanctions, and other outcomes.
Put simply, few other theories have proven to be as rich, parsimonious, and influential.
It is therefore important to highlight what we believe to be significant shortcomings.
17The authors argue that W and S capture independent information than measures of democracy versus
autocracy, despite earlier claiming that their theory explains the empirical relationship between democracy
and peace (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). See Clarke and Stone (2008) for a critique of the empirical
evidence that W and S explain outcomes better than standard measures of democracy. However, given that
the empirical proxies for W and S used by the authors are as crude as they are, it is difficult to know what
we can infer from the performance of these proxies relative to measures such as Polity. For example, simple
cross-tabs reveal that W is larger than S, despite being a subset thereof, in nearly 10% of observations.
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Negotiation and the Democratic Peace
In this section, we demonstrate that the non-standard bargaining protocol in the model ana-
lyzed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) is critical to producing their results. Naturally, this
would not itself be much of a concern if the authors provided strong theoretical justification
for making the assumptions they have about the bargaining protocol. But they do not, and
the bargaining protocol in their model is difficult to justify substantively. Specifically, while
the authors treat the issue in dispute as divisible, the terms of a negotiated agreement are
not chosen by the players but are instead treated as exogenous. Moreover, negotiated agree-
ments can be unilaterally imposed by one side regardless of whether the other would prefer
war to abiding by such terms. Though treating the good in dispute as divisible addresses
one part of the argument presented in Fearon (1995), their approach does not address the
more fundamental point Fearon raised: the costs of war are sufficient to ensure the existence
of a range of agreements that both sides prefer to war. We analyze a simpler model, one that
assumes one of the key results that they derive from their model, thereby stacking the deck
in favor of reproducing their argument. We show that the democratic peace is implied by our
model under their bargaining protocol, but is not apparently compatible with the ultimatum
bargaining protocol, which has become one of the standard protocols in the literature.
Specifically, we do not explicitly model reselection following the international crisis. Nor
do we explicitly model the selection of war effort, an important component of Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (1999). However, we take as given that patterns mirroring those derived by
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) obtain with respect to the relationship between domestic
institutions and the optimal war effort chosen by each side. This allows us to focus attention
strictly upon the importance of the author’s choice of bargaining protocol.
More formally, the leader of state 1, denoted L1, and the leader of state 2, L2, contest the
division of some good, whose value is normalized to 1. We assume that the good in dispute
is of value because it can be used to increase each leader’s resource base.18
18Note Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) argue that control of the good in dispute is a public good. However,
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We first assume the game begins with L1 choosing between war and a negotiated agree-
ment. We do not allow L2 the opportunity to reject the agreement. Under a negotiated
agreement, L1 receives x ∈ [0, 1] while L2 receives 1− x, where the value of x is exogenously
determined. This mirrors the bargaining protocol in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999).
We will then consider a version of the model with a more flexible bargaining protocol.
In this version, L1 is allowed to choose the value of x and L2 is allowed to decide whether
to accept or reject L1’s proposal. The payoffs for a negotiated settlement in this version are
the same: L1 receives x and L2 receives 1− x. The difference is simply that in this version,
the size of x is chosen by L1 and enacted if and only if L2 is willing to accept such a division
of the good, whereas Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) allow L1 to impose x on L2.
Wars are modeled identically in both versions of the model. L1 wins the war with
probability p and L2 wins with probability 1−p. Winning is assumed to be worth 1− ci and
losing worth −ci, where ci ∈ [0, 1] reflects i’s subjective loss of utility for incurring the costs
of war. Let p =
e1
e1 + e2
, where ei > 0 is the amount of resources leader Li devotes to the war
effort. We assume that Li selects ei to ensure that p maximizes their probability of survival
in office, subject to budget constraints. We assume war outcomes influence survival.19
More formally, let the optimal war effort be denoted by e∗i , and let e
∗
i increase as Wi
increases or Si decreases, and let the magnitude of this effect increase as Wj increases or Sj
decreases ∀ i 6= j. Thus ∂e
∗
i
∂Wi
> 0,
∂e∗i
∂Si
< 0,
∂2e∗i
∂Wi∂Wj
> 0 and
∂2e∗i
∂Si∂Sj
< 0.
Substantively, these assumptions indicate that leaders of more open regimes can be ex-
pected to try harder to win the wars they choose to fight, and leaders of all regimes are forced
to try harder to ensure the same probability of victory when facing an opponent who also
has domestic political incentives to try harder. These assumptions echo key results derived
in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999).
we need only assume that control of the good enables the leader to shore up domestic support, which would
be true if it expands the resource base irrespective of whether the leader will then use the additional resources
to provide more public goods or more private goods.
19However, the relationship between leadership survival, war outcomes, and domestic institutions may
differ substantially from that envisioned by selectorate theory. See, for example, Goemans (2000) and
Chiozza and Goemans (2004).
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Let us further assume that the cost Li incurs under the optimal war effort is a strictly
convex function of Li’s war effort. That is, we assume that the cost of war increases at an
increasing rate,
∂ci
∂ei
> 0 and
∂2ci
∂2ei
> 0. This indicates that there are diminishing returns
to scale, as we might expect given that p increases at a decreasing rate as e1 increases and
decreases at a decreasing rate as e2 increases. Since ci reflects the subjective loss of utility
associated with war under a given level of effort, this should be uncontroversial.
The solution for each version of the model is straightforward. Note that since we do
not explicitly model reselection or the choice of war effort, the version of the model with
the bargaining protocol equivalent to that in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) is not game-
theoretic, but simply decision theoretic. L1 chooses negotiation if and only if x ≥ p−c1 ≡ xˆ.
The democratic peace follows readily from the assumptions we made above. That is,
∂e∗1
∂W1
> 0,
∂2e∗1
∂W1∂W2
> 0,
∂c1
∂e1
> 0 and
∂2c1
∂2e1
> 0 ensure that c1 increases, and therefore xˆ
decreases, as W1 increases, and that effect itself increases as W2 increases. Therefore, the
conditions under which war occurs become more difficult to satisfy as the size of the minimum
winning coalitions in both states increase. If a large W is associated with democracy, then
pairs of democracies will be less likely to come into conflict with one another than other
pairs of states. Further, the impact of L1’s institutions depends upon L2’s, consistent with
the longstanding claim that the democratic peace is inherently dyadic.
Now let us turn to the second version, where L1 chooses the size of x and L2 decides
whether to accept L1’s proposed division of the good or reject it and go to war. L2 accepts
any x ≤ p+ c2. Since UL1(x = p+ c2) ≥ EUL1(x > p+ c2) is equivalent to p+ c2 ≥ p− c1 ⇔
c1 + c2 ≥ 0, L1 must always prefer to set x = p+ c2, which L2 is certain to accept. Since this
model always predicts peace, it cannot predict any relationship between W1, W2 and peace.
This informal proof is, of course, identical to that in Fearon (1995), which illustrates our
argument that Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) were able to claim that selectorate theory
explains the democratic peace only because they sidestepped Fearon’s argument about the
inefficiency of war through employing their particular bargaining protocol.
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Naturally, even though Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) assumed complete information,
one might reasonably wonder what the equilibria to this model look like if we assume in-
complete information, the primary explanation for war offered by Fearon (1995).
Let us now assume that leaders vary in the extent to which they suffer a subjective loss
of utility when devoting their optimal amount of resources towards the war effort. More
formally, let ρi =
∂ci
∂ei
∀ i ∈ {1, 2}. For simplicity, assume that ρ1 is known, while ρ2 takes
on one of two values, where L2 knows the value of ρ2 but L1 only knows the probability
distribution from which it is drawn. That is, assume ρ2 = ρ2 with probability q and ρ2 = ρ2
with probability 1 − q, where ρ
2
< ρ2. Then L1 knows that with probability q, L2 suffers
a greater loss of utility, denoted c2 = c2, when selecting the level of war effort necessary to
ensure the optimal probability of retaining office, and with probability 1− q, L2’s subjective
loss of utility is not as great, and c2 = c2, where c2 < c2.
There are two perfect Bayesian equilibria to this model, as we demonstrate in the ap-
pendix. In one, L1 sets x = p + c2 ≡ x, which L2 accepts regardless of type and thus war
never occurs. In the other, L2 sets x = p + c2 ≡ x, which L2 accepts if and only if c2 = c2
and therefore the ex ante probability of war is 1− q. The former equilibrium obtains when
q ≤ c1 + c2
c1 + c2
≡ qˆ. (1)
Simple comparative statics on 1 tell the rest of the story. Recall that c2 = c2 when
ρ2 = ρ2, where ρ2 =
∂c2
∂e2
. Since
∂e∗2
∂W2
> 0, c2 increases as W2 increases. Note that the
difference between c2 and c2 must increase as W2 increases.
20 Therefore, qˆ decreases as
W2 increases, and the conditions sustaining an equilibrium in which there is a non-zero
probability of war become easier to satisfy. This indicates that democracies make attractive
targets, as others have argued (Schultz 2001). Finally, since
∂c1
∂e∗1
> 0 and
∂e∗1
∂W1
> 0, c1
increases as W1 increases. Since qˆ increases as c1 increases, the conditions sustaining the
equilibrium with a positive probability of war become more difficult to satisfy asW1 increases.
20This is equivalent to the claim that if f ′(x) > g′(x), then f(a)− g(a) > f(b)− g(b) ∀ a > b.
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This leads to our first key result.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium exhibiting a positive probability of war exists under condi-
tions that are more difficult to satisfy as W1 increases or W2 decreases.
This result provides little support for the democratic peace as it is conventionally under-
stood. It suggests that we ought to observe a monadic peace in that leaders of democracies
must be more confident that their opponent suffers large costs when mobilizing for war be-
fore they are willing to make demands that carry a risk of rejection than are leaders of other
systems. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) observe, most studies conclude that there is
little evidence of a monadic peace, and they consider the fact that their model does not
anticipate such an effect to be a virtue. Further, since it indicates that the conditions under
which a leader is willing to make a demand that carries some risk of war are more readily
satisfied when the opponent is democratic, the incomplete information version of our model
appears to indicate that war is least likely to occur when the challenger is democratic and the
target autocratic. However, there is strong evidence that such dyads are amongst the most
conflict-prone (Bennett 2006). Perhaps surprisingly, the model also indicates that the most
war-prone dyads would consist of an autocratic challenger and a democratic target, which
are also amongst the most conflict-prone. Thus, our model suggests that dyads consisting
of one democratic and one autocratic state may exhibit either the highest or lowest risk of
war, relative to all other combinations, depending upon which is the challenger.
All models are simplifications. We are by no means convinced that the ultimatum proto-
col perfectly describes the way states actually negotiate. A vast literature based upon this
assumption has developed, and similar explanations for war emerge even under richer proto-
cols.21 Yet, regardless of whether this protocol perfectly matches real life negotiations, the
important point is that, since the democratic peace does not emerge under a commonly an-
alyzed protocol, the core assumptions of selectorate theory cannot be said to unambiguously
predict the democratic peace.
21See Powell (1999), Tarar and Leventog˘lu (2008), ?, and Tarar (N.d.).
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Individual Strategy and Public Good Provision
We turn now to the analysis of several closely related variants of a simple model of leader
selection. In each, members of the selectorate, denoted S, may either retain the incumbent
leader, L, or replace L with some challenger, C.
The only difference between the variants is the decision rule employed by members of S.
We first solve the game using a decision rule that mirrors that used by Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (2003). We then present the results obtained using several additional decision rules.
Some of these are less closely related to the core assumptions of selectorate theory but might
strike some as worth considering in order to build an alternative theory to arrive at the
conclusions offered by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
Each variant begins with L and C simultaneously stating their platforms. A platform
consists of two elements: a bundle of proposed expenditures on the provision of private
goods, which we denote νj =
∑S
i ν
j
i ∀ j ∈ {L,C}, i ∈ S, and a budget for the provision of
public goods, which we denote γj. No candidate can propose to spend more than the total
amount of resources available, which we treat as fixed and denote R. Thus νj + γj ≤ R.
We model the provision of private goods in a straightforward manner, as did Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003). In order to deliver νji to individual i, candidate j expends precisely ν
j
i
resources. However, we assume a more complicated production technology for public goods.
In order to deliver µj units of public goods, which by definition will be consumed by all
i ∈ S, candidate j must expend γj resources.22
We further assume that the production of public goods is inefficient, by which we mean
that γj > µj. That is, when candidate j allocates γj to the production of public goods,
the result is only worth µj to any given member of S. Nonetheless, it may be true that∑S
i µ
j ≥ γj > µj, indicating that the net social value exceeds the cost of production.
22We might assume the amount of public goods provided is increasing with the resources expended, i.e.,
∂µj
∂γj
> 0. We might further assume that the amount of goods produced is increasing at a decreasing rate,
or
∂2µj
∂2γj
< 0 ∀ j ∈ {L,C}. However, none of the key results depend upon such restrictions.
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Note that without assuming γj > µj, we could not possibly conclude that as W increases,
L is more likely to rely upon the provision of public goods in order to retain office, opting
for private goods when W is smaller. If γj ≤ µj, there would be no reason for any leader to
rely upon the provision of private goods, even if W were equal to 1.
After L and C state their platforms, the selectorate decides which candidate to support.
Throughout, we will assume that platforms are both credible and common knowledge.23 We
also assume L’s level of efficiency at generating public goods is common knowledge, though
members of S must rely upon a common prior expectation with respect to C’s ability to
produce public goods, such that for a given γC , all i expect to receive µˆCγC .
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Initially, we assume that members of S care only about the amount of public and private
goods they receive, though below, we will allow for expressive utility to be derived from the
act of supporting L. Yet in every version, i’s value for having j in office is νji + µ
j. We
assume candidate j receives R− νj − γj if they are selected to be leader, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, we assume throughout that current members of WL can expect to remain in L’s
coalition if and only if they support L, where W j ⊂ S denotes a set of size W whose elements
are non-identical to those in W¬j ⊂ S, which also contains W members. We also assume
that every member of S who supports C has the same probability of being included in WC ,
and thus expect to receive private goods from C only with probability
W
S
, which Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003) identify as a critical assumption of selectorate theory.
This model is simpler than any of the models discussed in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
For example, we simply assume that R resources are available to L without considering
the leader’s choice of tax rates or individual decisions with respect to leisure versus labor
decisions, etc. While lacking much of the nuance of the models the authors present, this
simple setup is sufficient to illustrate our argument.
23Naturally, one might argue that candidates can very easily choose to allocate fewer resources once in
office than they had pledged beforehand. However, since Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) assume credible
commitments, we will as well.
24Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 1999) make a similar assumption, though this is not strictly necessary
for any of our results.
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Now consider the solution to this game when employing a decision rule mirroring the one
used in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). That is, let L retain office so long as W members of
S derive greater utility from having L remain in office. More formally, we assume L retains
office if W members of S determine that EUi(L wins) ≥ EUi(C wins), or
νLi + µ
L ≥ W
S
νCi + µˆ
C
γC . (2)
Suppose C promises to allocate all of R in the form of private goods, giving
R
W
to each
member of WC . Then L can secure office either by setting νLi =
R
S
∀ i ∈ WL or by allocating
γL(
R
S
), which produces µL =
R
S
.
Note that so long as W
R
S
> γL(
R
S
), the former is less cost effective than the latter
and L will prefer to secure the support necessary for retaining office by providing public
goods rather than private goods. In other words, we can readily identify a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which L sets γL = γL(
R
S
), νL = 0, C sets γC = 0, νCi =
R
W
∀ i ∈ WC
and νCm = 0 ∀ m ∈ S/WC , and L retains office. In words, there exists an equilibrium in
which L retains office by providing public goods that match the quantity of private goods
that members of the selectorate could expect to receive if C took office. Importantly, this
equilibrium is more likely to obtain as W increases or S increases. Thus we have derived
some of the most important results of selectorate theory from our model, simple though it
is, having used the same decision rule as the authors.
A few words about the decision rule are in order. Inequality 2 focuses on whether W
members of S derive greater utility from having L in office than they do C. As Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003) did, we have identified the conditions under which one outcome is
preferred to another. However, the problem with employing this decision rule is that it does
not link individual strategies to aggregate outcomes. While we have required L and C to
choose strategies that maximize their expected utilities, we have not required members of S
to do so. In fact, we have not even specified what strategies members of S employ.
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If we assumed that the outcomes that maximize group utility obtain without requiring
that each player adopt their individual best response to the other players’ best responses,
there would be no dilemma to the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, one of the most famous
applications of non-cooperative game theory. Nonetheless, this is how Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (2003) determine whether L retains office.
We must acknowledge that a vibrant literature in political science similarly assumes that
outcomes preferred by sufficiently large number of voters will obtain in equilibrium.25 Such
is the case in spatial models of elections, for example, where it is often assumed that there is
full turnout, only two candidates to choose from, a single policy dimension, and each voter
votes for whichever candidate has proposed a platform nearest their ideal point.
However, there is a key difference between selectorate theory and the canonical spatial
model of voting. In such models, the assumption that voters support the candidate who
proposes a platform closest to their ideal point, without regard for whether their individual
decision to support that candidate has an appreciable impact on the likely outcome of the
election, is of little consequence with respect to the substantive conclusions. That is, while
this assumption abstracts away from the important question of why voters who are solely
concerned with policy outcomes choose to vote at all, the assumption of sincere voting in
a full turnout election with two candidates does not distort our analysis of what platforms
the candidates will propose, which is typically what scholars seek to identify with such
models. As with any formal model, it is not particularly useful to observe that one of the
key assumptions is unlikely to be empirically tenable without further demonstrating that
without this assumption, the results would differ in substantively important ways.
In other words, the fact that Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) do not require individual
voters to choose strategies that maximize their expected utility would of course not be a
problem if the substantive conclusions following from their model would not differ if we
required voters to do so. If a model in which members of S are required to choose strategies
25For overviews of the literature, see, inter alia, McCarty and Meirowitz (2007) and Mueller (2003).
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that maximize their individual expected utilities, and where aggregate outcomes reflect these
choices, continued to suggest that L is more likely to provide public goods as W increases
and S decreases, the authors’ choice of decision rule would be innocuous.
Unfortunately, that is not the case. Suppose that we no longer assume L retains office
when W members of S derive greater utility from having L remain in office, but instead
require each i ∈ S to adopt the individual strategy that maximizes their expected utility.
More formally, let each i ∈ S support L if and only if EUi(support L) ≥ EUi(support C), or
p(νLi + µ
L) + (1− p)µˆCγC ≥ pµL + (1− p)(
W
S
νCi + µˆ
C
γC ) (3)
where p denotes the probability that L retains office with i’s support, p denotes the prob-
ability that L retains office absent i’s support. Given the nature of public goods, we argue
that this is a more appropriate decision rule. If each i chooses whom to support by evalu-
ating inequality 3, i will have assumed that she will receive any public goods provided by j
regardless of whether she supports j, yet also assumed that she must support j in order to
receive private goods from j in the event that j takes office.
This brings our to our next key result.
Proposition 2. There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium to the leader selection game
using the decision rule outlined by inequality 3, where L sets νL = γL = 0.
The intuition behind this result is that when members of S concern themselves solely
with the amount of goods they expect to receive as a function of whom they individually
choose to support, if L does not propose to allocate any resources to anyone, every member
of S may nonetheless be indifferent between supporting L and supporting C. If we assume
that members of S default to supporting L when indifferent, as we implicitly did above, then
L wins despite not allocating any goods to anyone because no individual member of S can
benefit by deviating and pledging their support to C. If they did so, C still would not win,
and they would continue to expect to receive nothing.
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This equilibrium pretty clearly does not match reality, though its existence is telling
theoretically. Of course, it rests critically upon an arbitrary assumption about how members
of S behave when indifferent. So let us now allow members of S to receive arbitrarily
small rewards or punishments for expressing support for the incumbent, irrespective of the
outcome. These parameters will function primarily to break ties. More formally, let each
i ∈ S receive αLi ∼ U [−, ] when supporting L. Let each αLi be known by i and only i. That
is, no member of S can know how non-material considerations will influence the behavior of
any other member of S, nor can the candidates. The primary effect of these terms is to make
selector’s decisions probabilistic, preventing strange equilibria like the one just discussed. We
then obtain the next key result.
Proposition 3. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium to the leader selection game with non-
material incentives to support the incumbent, L’s choice of γL is increasing in W , all else
equal, but only takes on positive values if the difference between p and p is non-trivial.
This appears to support the conclusions of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). All else
equal, L allocates greater resources towards the provision of public goods as W increases. If
we associate large values of W with democracy, this would seem to indicate that democrats
are more likely to provide public goods than are their authoritarian counterparts.
However, the restriction that L only sets γL > 0 when p− p takes on non-trivial values is
quite powerful. Scholars have long recognized that it is highly implausible that a single voter’s
decision influences the outcome of a national election in a modern electoral democracy.26 If
the best explanation for the provision of public goods we can come up with is that voters
in democracies are dissuaded from supporting the challenger for fear that if they do not
support the incumbent, they significant decrease the prospects of the leader being retained
and therefore being able to provide the public goods they pledged, we do not have much of
an explanation of the supposed link between democracy and public goods provision at all.
26Riker and Ordeshook (1968) sought to resolve the paradox that voters do in fact vote in elections even
though they cannot hope to influence the outcome. While many others have offered alternative explanations,
very few have disputed the claim that voters are unlikely to believe that their vote has a non-trivial impact.
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For this reason, we now consider two additional variants of the model. These are less
closely related to the core assumptions of selectorate theory. Yet, if we could arrive at
essentially the same conclusions as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) after relaxing the strong
assumption of extreme self-interest, many might feel that it is of little interest that selectorate
theory does not itself produce such conclusions. After all, the most recent literature suggests
voters care about how the outcome of the election affect the nation as a whole.27
We thus replace αLi with α
L
i (µ
L), where we assume
∂αLi (µ
L)
∂µL
≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ S. That is, we
assume that that all members of the selectorate derive utility from expressing support for
leaders who they expect will produce goods that benefit the entire society.28
Proposition 4. If expressive utilities are sufficiently sensitive to public good provision, L
sets γL > 0 and the relationship between democracy and L’s choice of γL is ambiguous.
When the level of support an incumbent leader expects to receive is directly related to
the amount of public goods they produce, not because members of S must support L to
receive the goods but because they derive greater utility from supporting L for expressive
reasons when L produces public goods, all leaders produce public goods. Whether democrats
produce more is unclear.
We could of course assume that it is only in some societies that members of S derive
expressive utility from supporting leaders who produce public goods. Such an argument
would seemingly allow us to account for the results reported by Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003). We hope the problems with such an argument are self-evident. Not only would
such an argument border on tautological, but it would require us to explain the difference in
standard of living between that in the Western world and less developed and less democratic
areas, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, by assuming that it is only in the Western world that
people worry about the wellbeing of their fellow citizens.
27See in particular Edlin, Gelman and Kaplan (2007), Fowler (2006), Grafstein (2009), and especially
Feddersen, Gailmard and Sandroni (2009).
28We might alternatively assume that the expressive utility is a function of the difference between µL and
µˆCγC . However, this is would have little bearing on our substantive conclusions. Further, there appears to be
evidence that voters do in fact vote based on blind retrospective evaluations (Achen and Bartles N.d.).
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Finally, we consider one last variant of the model. Here we assume that in all societies,
there are two general types of selectors. All members of S derive utility from the goods
provided to them by the winner of the selection contest, and all members of S consider the
impact of their individual decision of whom to support on the likely outcome. Further, we
continue to assume that all members of S derive some arbitrarily small expressive utility from
supporting L. The only difference is that, for some members of S, this utility is independent
of µL, while for others it is not. That is, for one group,
∂αLi
∂µL
= 0, while for some group
P ⊂ S, ∂α
L
p (µ
L)
∂µL
≥ 0 ∀ p ∈ P, p 6= i. We refer to P as the set of S that is public-spirited.
Proposition 5. Provided the proportion of S that is public-spirited is sufficiently large, it
is impossible for L to retain office without γL > 0 after W crosses some threshold while it
remains possible to set γL = 0 for values of W below this threshold.
This result would appear to bring us full circle back to the conclusions of Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003). However, if we are comfortable trying to explain behavior by assuming
actors derive inherent utility from their actions, even if our results would not hold without
such assumptions, we should also assume that L derives inherent utility from setting γL > 0.
Corrolary 1. If leaders derive sufficient utility from providing for all of their people, there
is an equilibrium in which the choice of γL is independent of W .
We believe there is little value to the argument that good outcomes occur in democracies
because most people demand good things, while outcomes under autocracy are typically bad
because autocratic leaders are typically too selfish to want to help their people. Important
elements of this argument border on tautological. But for the fact that many scholars
strongly believe that democracy itself is a cause of good outcomes, it is difficult to imagine
that an argument such as this would be met with anything but extreme skepticism.29
29For example, it is unclear how this argument differs substantially from the claim that suicide terrorists
behave as they do because they derive inherent utility from their actions, irrespective of the obvious material
incentive to behave otherwise, or the claim that voters vote because it is their civic duty to do so and they
derive expressive utility from doing their duty (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), an explanation that failed to
convince many that the paradox of voting had been resolved.
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Do Democracies Actually Provide More Public Goods?
The primary reason we are reluctant to embrace the results above, though they appear to
account for the empirical results reported by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), is that we
believe those results tell us relatively little about the relationship between democracy and
the provision of public goods. Specifically, we see good reason to question whether there is
in fact compelling evidence of a relationship between regime type and the provision of true
public goods, and so we are hesitant to introduce assumptions about the desire to produce
public goods, or to see public goods produced, on behalf of leaders or the selectorate.
Our skepticism of the claim that democracies produce public goods is twofold. First,
we see little reason to conclude that many of the outcomes analyzed by Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (2003), such as the number of hospital beds, rates of female secondary education,
immunizations, and so forth, are either non-rival or non-excludable. While it may be true in
practice that few governments restrict access to hospitals or schools on the basis of political
allegiance, there is an important difference between policies that exhibit some level of public-
spiritedness and proper public goods. It is eminently feasible, for example, to provide a
hospital bed to one citizen without all others benefiting simultaneously.
This distinction is important because Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) never argue that
any leader, regardless of the size of W , provides public goods because they wish to benefit
everyone. Rather, their key claim is that leaders who desire nothing more than to secure
the support of the minimally necessary number of selectors will find it economically efficient
to provide goods that satisfy everyone by virtue of the fact that they are non-excludable.
Thus, it is absolutely central to the logic of their argument that leaders of large W systems
provide true public goods, goods that benefit everyone, even though democratic leaders, like
all leaders, have no particular desire to make everyone happy.
This brings us to our second source of skepticism. If leaders of democracies, due to the
size of W , had no choice but to implement policies that benefit everyone, there should be
unambiguous evidence that democracy is good for the poor and for the environment.
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We leave aside concerns that even with respect to health and education outcomes, the
evidence is not as clear as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) suggest (Nelson 2007) and grant,
for the sake of argument, that more people receive more goods in democracies than non-
democracies. But if democratic governments do in fact provide true public goods, we should
expect that the poorest in society, who presumably are not part of W , will only benefit from
goods provided to all. We also should see clear evidence that democracy is associated with
greater environmental stewardship, since clean air and preservation of the environment are
canonical, textbook examples of true public goods, whose provision is non-excludable.
But the evidence that democracy reduces poverty is not unambiguous. Ross (2006)
argues that the apparent relationship between democracy and poverty reduction (e.g., Prze-
worski et al. (2000)) is misleading. Most studies of the relationship between democracy and
poverty, often proxied by infant mortality rates, rely upon significantly reduced samples due
to missing data. If the data were missing randomly, this would naturally be of little concern.
Unfortunately, as Ross demonstrates quite compellingly, this is not the case.
Ross hypothesizes that democracies can generally be expected to report infant mortality
rates, in addition to a broad array of other statistics. Yet the incentive for autocrats to
do so is not apparent. That is, unless there is outside pressure on them to do so, which is
likely to be the case for the least economically developed autocracies, who frequently require
assistance from the IMF. The IMF, which maintains a database on statistics related to
economic development, expects clients to report these statistics. Ross tests this hypothesis
and finds that there are less likely to be missing values for infant and child mortality data for
both democracies and states bound by IMF agreements, and that, amongst autocracies, there
is a strong postive relationship between economic development and missing data. Therefore,
an analysis of regime type and infant mortality that does not correct for the non-random
nature of the missing data will be biased in favor of finding that autocracies perform worse.
Ross then uses multiple imputation to correct the problem and finds that there is no
relationship between democracy and infant or child mortality. This should not surprise us,
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because the policy tools available to governments to reduce infant and child mortality are
not technically public goods and can be targeted to some parts of the population and not
others. Finally, he demonstrates that there is also no relationship between regime type and
the ratio of treatments for various maladies received by rich relative to the poor.
Similarly, Scruggs (N.d.) argues that most of the work purporting to show that democ-
racy reduces environmental degradation (e.g., Li and Reuveny (2006)) suffers from serious
shortcomings, such as reducing environmental degradation to one or two measures, such as
sulfur dioxide emissions or deforestation. Offering a systematic evaluation of 58 studies on
the topic, Scruggs (N.d.) seeks to correct common flaws. Most notably, he employs eight
indicators to provide a broader measure of environmental degradation, and also assess the
impact of changes in regime type on the trajectory of environmental performance, rather
than simply analyzing contemporaneous levels of both, thereby addressing concerns that
economic development might cause both democracy and cleaner environments. After ad-
dressing these concerns, Scruggs (N.d.) finds no evidence that democracy promotes better
stewardship of the environment. He concludes that economic development is more likely
responsible for the apparent association.
Admittedly, a cursory review of a few recent studies cannot settle the debate. We ac-
knowledge this. Moreover, we stress that we do not dispute that our reformulation of selec-
torate theory predicts that the resources at a nation’s disposal are more likely to be shared
broadly in democracies than non-democracies. The distinction between providing benefits
to many as opposed to all is not inconsequential, but we do not wish to exaggerate it either.
Depending upon the question of interest, scholars sometimes will, and sometimes will not,
find the distinction between our preferred interpretation of selectorate theory and the claims
of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) to be relevant.30
30For example, several scholars find that democracy does not decrease the risk of civil war (Fearon and
Laitin 2003, Henderson 2002), though see also Hegre (2001). Insofar as one of the explanations for civil war
is popular grievances (Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004), the question of whether democrats produce policies that
benefit everyone rather than
W
N
of the people, may be quite important.
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Conclusion
Selectorate theory has proven to be very influential in the study of politics, not only because
it claims to provide an explanation for the democratic peace, but also to yield important
insights into international cooperation, and a variety of domestic outcomes. Many also find
the theory attractive due its relative parsimony. Seemingly, we need only assume that leaders
typically enjoy wielding power and that their subjects prefer to receive more goods rather
than less, in order to explain a wide range of empirical regularities. Even those who are
reluctant to claim that democracies instill in their citizens greater virtues can nonetheless
believe that democratic governance is critical for producing peace (at least amongst fellow
democracies) and prosperity (assumed to be more likely to obtain when leaders provide public
goods, such as the rule of law). The appeal of such a theory is obvious. The implications
are both surprising, given the nature of the assumptions, as well as normatively satisfying.
Yet, as we hope to have illustrated, this stylized interpretation is not warranted. Specif-
ically, some of the most celebrated results reported in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) and
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) are less parsimonious than the authors claim, as they de-
pend critically upon modeling assumptions that neither are justified by the core logic of their
theory nor substantively easy to defend.
With respect to the democratic peace, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) implicitly assumed
that when states negotiate with one another, neither of them has any influence on the
distribution of benefits each would receive. Moreover, they assumed that peace requires
the consent of only one party, in contrast to the traditional interpretation of anarchy. We
analyzed a very simple model, one in which we assumed the very patterns Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (1999) derived from their model with respect to the relationship between domestic
institutions and optimal war effort. Despite this substantial simplification, we found that
the democratic peace obtained under their bargaining protocol, but appears incompatible
with the more flexible protocol found in Fearon (1995), which has subsequently become one
of the standard ways of modeling crisis bargaining.
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We acknowledge that the particular manner in which we chose to represent incomplete
information does not follow directly any of the assumptions in Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(1999), who assumed complete information. Yet even if the democratic peace could be
reconciled with our model using a different approach to modeling incomplete information,
we would continue to argue that there is no unambiguous evidence that the core assumptions
of selectorate theory point towards the democratic peace. We contend that if a theory can
only account for a given finding under arbitrary specifications that are not informed by the
core assumptions of the theory, that theory provides a poor explanation for said finding.
After replacing the non-standard bargaining protocol used by Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(1999) with the ultimatum bargaining protocol, we derived rather puzzling results regarding
the relationship between regime type and conflict. We are relatively untroubled by these
results because we see the model we presented as being useful for illustrating the fragile
nature of the results reported by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) but not necessarily so
for generating novel empirical implications. For the sake of argument, we found it useful to
assume from the outset that certain patterns with respect to war effort. However, it is not
obvious to us, given our subsequent arguments about public goods, that we would want to
build a model on such assumptions if we wished to generate empirical implications.
With respect to public goods, though they are non-excludable by definition, in order to
prove that leaders of large W systems are required to provide public goods if they wish to
retain office, the authors assumed that members of S make decisions without regard for the
relationship between their individual behavior and their individual access to goods. Members
of S are fundamentally non-strategic in their models.
To illustrate this, we analyzed a very simple model, one that lacked many of the moving
parts found in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). Despite these differences, we first showed
that if we employed the same decision rule as the authors, we could reproduce their key
claims. However, once we adopted more appropriate decision rules, we no longer found
evidence that democrats are likely to distribute public goods.
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In some respects, our argument is anything but novel, though its implications may sur-
prise some. Scholars have long recognized it is important to focus on the incentives facing
individual members of the (s)electorate. We also consider it to be reassuring that Smith
and Bueno de Mesquita (N.d.) have developed a more sophisticated model than the simple
one we analyzed here, which they use to explain the paradox of voting. Their model, like
ours, suggests that members of large electorates do not choose whom to support on the basis
of which candidate proposes to advance the public interest, but rather base their decisions
upon how their individual behavior impacts their access to particularistic goods.
We also demonstrated that if we assume members of S, or even leaders themselves, are
less narrowly self-interested than they are assumed to be in selectorate theory, we might
expect to observe public goods provision, and potentially a relationship between regime type
and public goods provision. However, the models that allowed for this had some unappealing
properties. We are reluctant to read too much into these results.
There are important questions to be raised about the extent to which the policies enacted
by democratic governments produce benefits that are non-rival and non-excludable – which
is, after all, the definition of a public good. While the policies of modern democracies may
exhibit some level of public spiritedness, that is not the same as providing a public good.31
The important distinction is whether leaders of democracies produce value primarily for the
members of their winning coalition, which by definition already entails providing greater
services than we would expect to observe in autocracies, or serve the interests of everyone
in society. The analysis presented in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) cannot address this
question adequately. Recent articles that investigate the relationship between regime type
and poverty, on the one hand, and regime type and environmental degradation, on the
other, find little evidence that democracy does helps the poor (Ross 2006) or discourages
environmental degradation (Scruggs N.d.).
31This is to say nothing of the question of whether the bulk of government spending does in fact improve
the welfare of the average citizen. Suffice it to say that substantial literatures in public choice and economics
challenge this view (Mueller 2003).
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We leave it for others to evaluate whether economic factors or other forces are more prox-
imately responsible for the outcomes we often attribute to democracy. While the democratic
peace is widely accepted, we are not the first to observe that the historical record simply
has not provided us sufficient variation to allow us to confidently rule out all the alternative
explanations for the dramatic reduction of militarized conflict in the Western world since
1945.32 Insofar as one of the primary explanations for the democratic peace, selectorate
theory, yielded many additional observable implications that were empirically corroborated,
one might not be troubled by this. Yet we believe that our results, in combination with
those of Clarke and Stone (2008) and others, largely undercut any such argument. Many
of the things that ought to be true if the common interpretation of selectorate theory was
correct are, at minimum, open to dispute.
Note that our criticisms deal specifically with how Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003,
1999) characterize the behavior of leaders of democratic polities, which has played a deeply
influential role in the study of the democratic peace. However, one of the central motivating
puzzles discussed in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) concerns the empirical observation
that those leaders whose people suffer most appear to have the strongest hold on power.
Their answer to this important puzzle is that, in authoritarian regimes, “good policy is
bad politics”. Nothing in the variants of the model that continue to assume self-interested
behavior challenges this claim, nor do we wish to suggest this is not a compelling, if unhappy,
explanation. Though we did not focus on this question above, the version of our model with
expressive utilities that are not tied to the leader’s provision of public goods indicates that
the probability that a leader remains in office is strictly decreasing with the size of the
winning coalition, and that the rents from office follow a similar pattern. Thus, we agree
with Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) that the leaders of less inclusive regimes will provide
little for most of their people while extracting vast resources for personal consumption, and
nonetheless will be relatively secure with respect to their hold on office.33
32See Gartzke (2007), Gibler (2007), Henderson (2002, 2009) and Ward, Siverson and Cao (2007).
33See the proof of Proposition 3 in the appendix.
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But we see no reason to stop there. While we acknowledge that it is an oversimpli-
fication, we argue that all leaders govern primarily with the interests of the members of
their winning coalition in mind, with little regard for the well-being of anyone else. To be
sure, there are problems with this claim. Leaders of democracies probably rely more on
club goods than either private or public goods.34 They also often implement policies that
will disproportionately benefit groups that, in aggregate, support them at higher rates than
other groups, rather than explicitly targeting resources towards specific individuals whom
they know have expressed support for them. We readily acknowledge these shortcomings.
Yet insofar as there is a lot to be gained from broad generalizations, and we believe there
is, we find this simplified claim more useful than the equally simplified claim that autocrats
serve the interests of their winning coalitions while democrats serve the interests of everyone.
Our criticism of the depiction of democratic politics in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003,
1999), where leaders have no choice but to make everyone happy, where there is no real
meaningful distributive element to the political process, should not be interpreted as in-
dicating that we find no merit in selectorate theory. We simply believe that some of the
most widely celebrated claims associated with selectorate theory, specifically with regards
to the democratic peace and the provision of public goods, are problematic. Nonetheless,
we continue to believe that the core assumptions that leaders desire to remain in office, and
that important political outcomes can be better understood if we focus on variation across
polities in terms of the proportion of the population that has a say in who gets to be leader
and the subset of that group whose support is minimally necessary, are profoundly useful.
34We thank Erik Gartzke for pointing this out.
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Appendix
Crisis Bargaining
Proposition 1. There are two pure strategy PBEs to the model with incomplete information.
In the first, L1 sets x = x; the strong L2 accepts if and only if x ≤ x; the weak L2 accepts if
and only if x ≤ x. In the second, L1 sets x = x; the strong L2 accepts if and only if x ≤ x;
the weak L2 accepts if and only if x ≤ x.
L1’s optimal offer is straightforward. If L1 sets x > x, war results with certainty, which
cannot be optimal since x ≡ p + c2 > p − c1. If L1 sets x < x, L1 foregoes better terms of
agreement than would have been available had L1 set x = x, which L2 is certain to accept
regardless of type. If L1 sets x < x < x, L1 receives the same payoff when L2 is strong as
L1 would had received had L1 set x = x, and L1’s payoff from having the weak L2 accept
is strictly inferior to L1’s payoff from having the weak L2 accept x = x. Given the choice
between x = x and x = x, L1’s strategy follows immediately from inequality 1.
L2’s strategy follows readily from setting uL2(acc) ≥ EUL2(rej) ⇔ 1 − x ≥ 1 − p − c2.
When L2 is strong, i.e. ρ = ρ and thus c2 = c2, this simplifies to x ≤ p + c2 ≡ x. When L2
is weak, i.e. ρ = ρ and thus c2 = c2, this simplifies to x ≤ p+ c2 ≡ x.
The probability of war in the equilibrium where L1 sets x = x is 0. When L1 sets x = x,
the ex ante probability of war is 1 − q. The former equilibrium exists if and only if q ≤ qˆ,
the latter if and only if q > qˆ. Therefore, Proposition 1 follows from the comparative statics
on inequality 1, which are discussed in the text.
Leader Selection
Proposition 2. The following beliefs and pure strategies constitute a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium. L sets νL = 0 and γL = 0; C sets νCi =
R
W
∀ i ∈ WC , νCm = 0 ∀ m ∈ S/WC
and γC = 0; all i ∈ S support L iff inequality 3 holds, supporting C otherwise, and believe
µˆCγC > 0 if γ
C > 0, µˆCγC = 0 otherwise, and believe p = 1, p = 1.
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Note that the appropriate solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium since the
actor’s strategies depend upon their beliefs, µˆC , p and p. However, note that since the
behavior of the selectorate is deterministic, all i ∈ S can update their beliefs p and p to
certainty. Also note that the actors do not have the opportunity to learn about µˆC .
Specifically, since every member of S supports L in equilibrium, and L requires the
support of only W members of S, then from the perspective of any given i, L wins either
with or without i’s support. Thus p = 1 and p = 1.
Substituting the equilibrium platforms for L and C into inequality 3, we get
p · 0 + (1− p) · 0 ≥ p · 0 + (1− p)(W
S
R
W
),
which, after substituting in p = 1 and p = 1, simplifies to
0 + 0 ≥ 0 + 0(R
S
),
or simply 0 ≥ 0. Thus, i’s strategy is incentive compatible, as 0 ≥ 0 is true by definition.
Given that L expects to retain office, L has no incentive to set νL > 0 or γL > 0. Thus,
L’s strategy is incentive compatible.
C has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy, since C cannot prevent L
from winning by changing her platform, nor does C’s payoff depend upon her platform in
any equilibrium in which C does not take office. This completes the proof.
Proposition 3. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, each i ∈ S supports L if and only if
p(νLi + µ
L) + (1− p)µˆCγC + αLi ≥ pµL + (1− p)(
W
S
νCi + µˆ
C
γC ), (4)
where µˆCγC > 0 if γ
C > 0 and µˆCγC = 0 otherwise.
Solving inequality 4 for αLi , we can alternatively say that i supports L if α
L
i ≥ αˆLi , where
αˆLi ≡ (µˆCγC − µL)(p − p) + (1 − p)
W
S
νCi − pνLi . While candidate j cannot know whether
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m ∈ S,m 6= i will support L, given that i does not know the value of αLm, i knows that the
probability that m ∈ S,m 6= i supports L, which we’ll denote SLm, is given by
SLm =

− αˆLm
2
if − ≤ αˆLm ≤ 
0 if αˆLm > 
1 if αˆLm < −
Then p is the probability that L’s expected level of support is at least as large as W ,
where L’s expected level of support is 1 +
∑
m
SLm. Similarly, p is the probability that L’s
expected level of support without i is at least as large as W , or pr(
∑
m
SLm) ≥ W .
From the perspective of L, the probability of retaining office is pr(
S∑
i
SLi ≥ W ) ≡ pˆ,
and the optimal values of νL and γL depend upon L’s expected utility, pˆ(R − νL − γL),
subject to the constraint νL +γL ≤ R. The optimal allocations can be found by maximizing
pˆ(R− νL − γL)− λ(νL + γL −R) with respect to νL and γL, respectively.
We are particularly interested in L’s choice of γL, which is given by
λ =
∂pˆ
∂γL
(R− νL − γL)− pˆ. (5)
Intuitively, this tells us that if R increased, L would increase γL in proportion to the
impact of γL on her probability of retaining office, weighted by the rents L extracts from office
upon victory, while decreasing γL as her expected probability of retaining office increases.
Clearly, pˆ at least weakly decreases as W increases, since pˆ = pr(
S∑
i
SLi ≥ W ). This
indicates that, all else equal, L’s optimal γL increases as W increases.
However, inspection of αˆLi clearly indicates that the impact of γ
L on the probability that
any given i supports L, or SLi , goes to 0 as p − p goes to 0. In the limit, as p − p → 0,
∂pˆ
∂γL
→ 0, and by 5, we can see that L’s optimal allocation of resources towards the provision
of public goods, which cannot take on negative values, must also go to 0.
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Proposition 4. Now suppose that in any PBE, each i ∈ S supports L if and only
p(νLi + µ
L) + (1− p)µˆCγC + αLi (µL) ≥ pµL + (1− p)(
W
S
νCi + µˆ
C
γC ), (6)
where µˆCγC > 0 if γ
C > 0 and µˆCγC = 0 otherwise, and
∂αLi (µ
L)
∂µL
≥ 0. Unlike above, we no
longer constrain αLi (µ
L) to be distributed uniformly between [−, ].
Solving inequality 6 for αLi (µ
L), we can alternatively say that i supports L if αLi (µ
L) ≥
αˆLi (µ
L) ≡ (µˆCγC − µL)(p− p) + (1− p)
W
S
νci − pνLi .
As above, the impact of γL on αˆLi (µ
L)→ 0 as p−p→ 0. However, since αLi (µL) increases
with µL and µL increases with γL, we cannot conclude that the probability that i supports
L, SLi , becomes independent of γ
L even as p−p→ 0. Rather, ∂S
L
i
∂γL
≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ S and ∂pˆ
∂γL
≥ 0
irrespective of the size of W or S. Recall that L’s optimal γL, which is still given by 5, is
increasing in
∂pˆ
∂γL
. Thus, even when p− p→ 0, the optimal γL remains positive.
Whether L’s optimal γL increases or decreases with W and S is unclear. On the one hand,
as W increases, all else equal, pˆ decreases, which increases the optimal γL. On the other hand,
as S increases, αˆLi (µ
L) decreases, increasing the probability that αLi (µ
L) ≥ αˆLi (µL) holds,
meaning SLi increases and pˆ increases, which decreases the optimal γ
L. Since democracy is
associated with large W and large S, this may or may not indicate a greater optimal γL
than would obtain for regimes with a small W and a small S.
Proposition 5. Let
∂αLp (µ
L)
∂µL
= 0 ∀ p ∈ P ⊂ S while ∂α
L
i
∂µL
= 0 ∀ i ∈ S/P . Take some
arbitrary WD and WA where WD > WA. Now fix S to be sufficiently large that p − p is
arbitrarily close to 0. Then provided S − P < WA < P < WD, if follows from the proofs
of Propositions 3 and 4 that the optimal γL for the leader must be positive if W = WD.
However it can be optimal for L to garner the support of WA members of S/P while setting
γL = 0. Note that the first expression in L’s optimal γL, given by 5, is arbitrarily close to
0 when p− p is arbitrarily close to 0, as we have already stipulated. Further, pˆ increases as
WD decreases, decreasing the optimal γL until it eventually reaches 0.
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Corrolary 1. Suppose EUL(ν
L, γL) = pˆ(R− νL − γL) + β where ∂β
∂µL
≥ 0.
Then, following the same logic used in the proof of Proposition 3, L’s optimal γL is
λ =
∂pˆ
∂γL
(R− νL − γL)− pˆ+ ∂β
∂γL
. (7)
The most likely case for L to set γL = 0 is when W > S−P , which allows L to assemble
a winning coalition without including any members of P , while S is sufficiently large to
effectively remove the impact of γL on αˆLi for i ∈ S/P by driving p − p, and thus
∂pˆ
∂γL
,
arbitrarily close to 0.
If
∂β
∂µL
is sufficiently large, then since
∂µL
∂γL
≥ 0, even as the first term in 7 gets arbitrarily
close to 0, the impact of
∂β
∂γL
will still outweigh the negative impact of pˆ.
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